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“Theodor W. Adorno formulated the problem of faith in progress quite drastically: he said that 
progress, seen accurately, is progress from the sling to the atom bomb. Now this is certainly an 
aspect of progress that must not be concealed. To put it another way: the ambiguity of progress 
becomes evident. Without doubt, it offers new possibilities for good, but it also opens up appalling 
possibilities for evil—possibilities that formerly did not exist. We have all witnessed the way in 
which progress, in the wrong hands, can become and has indeed become a terrifying progress in 
evil. If technical progress is not matched by corresponding progress in man's ethical formation, 
in man's inner growth (cf. Eph 3:16; 2 Cor 4:16), then it is not progress at all, but a threat for 
man and for the world.” 
 ~Pope Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi 
 
“Augustine realized that redemption and history can exist neither without each other nor within 
each other but only in tension, the accumulated energy of which finally desires nothing less than 
the sublation of the historical world itself for the sake of nothing less than this, however, can the 
idea of progress still be thought in the age of catastrophe.”  
~Theodor Adorno, Critical Models 
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 The title of this project should not sit easily with the reader. The bringing together a 
Roman Bishop from the fourth century with the twentieth century Marxist philosopher certainly 
seems counter-intuitive; however bringing them together has potential to bring out certain 
aspects of their writings, which would otherwise go unexamined. In their book, The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer develop Marx’s concept of alienated 
consciousness, which Adorno further clarifies in later essays and lectures. In this project I will 
explore this development from consciousness, which is alienated through economic 
circumstances (Marx) to a consciousness that is fundamentally alienated through the genesis of 
consciousness itself. Generally understood, this alienation can be simply described as alienation 
from nature, from others, and from self, which is remarkably similar to the Augustine’s 
conception of the fallen man, wherein the effects of the fall can be simply described as alienation 
from self, from others, from nature, and adding the theological aspect: alienation from God. The 
purpose of this project is to explore, examine, and analyze the origins and phenomenology of 
these two conceptions of humanity’s existential state. The obvious point of contact between these 
two thinkers is the question of progress. Indeed, Adorno himself quotes Augustine his essay 
titled “On Progress” in his Critical Models. Such work has been investigated indirectly by 
Adorno’s student, Karl Heinz Haag, who inspired Adorno’s short dialogue with Augustine, in his 
Forschritt der Philosophie, and has been directly addressed by Peter Uwe Hohendahl in 
“Progress Revisited: Adorno's Dialogue with Augustine, Kant, and Benjamin.”  The choice to 
begin the dialogue between these two thinkers on the level of self, however is a conscious 
decision to attempt to create a more intense investigation into intersections of theology and 
critical theory that can potentially lay the ground-work for future projects of a similar nature.  
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I first began conceptualizing this project over two years ago, when I read the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment for the first time. I recognized Adorno’s brilliance in the vigor of his critique of 
the culture industry; however I felt that a dimension was missing from his paradigm—a 
dimension of theological speculation. In its foundations, this project was oriented toward a 
theological expansion of this critique by outlining the pervasiveness of the culture industry as 
having spiritual implications, as well as material. As I began to ponder how this project could be 
accomplished I realized I would have to begin by displaying the similarities between Adorno’s 
understanding of alienation and a Christian understanding of original sin. Defining a single 
Christian conception of original sin that could be set next to Adorno proved to be beyond the 
extent of this project and so I chose a thinker, whose conception of fallenness seemed to most 
closely pair with Adorno’s thought—Augustine.  
There are obvious theoretical issues with attempting a synthesis of Adorno and ancient 
Christian theology. The first and potentially most problematic issue with attempting this 
synthesis is the stark contrast between Adorno’s metaphysical position of historical materialism 
and Augustine’s position of strict theism and belief in the immaterial soul. I circumvent this 
problem through a phenomenological approach, through which I can compare these theories’ 
phenomenological accounts of alienation, which would avoid the problem of metaphysics. This 
problem cannot, of course be completely ignored and I will acknowledge the critical differences 
in the discussion of the similarities. Originally, this project was conceived as proposing a 
synthesis of the two thinkers, but after beginning my investigation, I chose to begin by simply 
showing the parallels in thought between Adorno and Augustine. I position Adorno’s 
understanding of alienated consciousness within the tradition of Marxism, in order to justify the 
theological engagement with Adorno, specifically. I will then provide a thorough, in depth 
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phenomenological analysis of Adorno’s concept of consciousness, how it emerges as alienated, 
and how it becomes reified by the culture Industry, while working predominantly with the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Culture Industry Revisited,” and the essay, which is central to 
this portion of the project, “On Subject and Object.” After establishing a phenomenology of 
Adorno’s concept, the focus will switch to the Christian-side of things. I plan to explicate 
Augustine’s conception of the fallen man through his major works, such as Confessions, City of 
God, On the Trinity, among other minor texts. I also will engage with limited secondary 
literature on Augustine in order to justify the use of modern language within the context of 
Augustine’s ancient writings. The third portion of this project will consist in the critical 
discussion of the two conceptions, wherein I will critically analyze the similarities and 
differences of both Authors. The project will conclude with self-reflection and point toward the 
potential of future projects of a similar nature.  
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Adorno’s Alienated Consciousness 
 Adorno does not specifically devote any intellectual effort the exposition of the 
phenomenology of his concept of alienated consciousness, which is the subject of this paper. The 
project of Adorno is oriented always towards critique, not necessarily toward the exposition of 
his concepts. I will nonetheless attempt to explicate the phenomenon of which Adorno speaks 
when critiquing the culture industry as institutional reification of alienated consciousness. I begin 
this explication of the phenomena of alienated consciousness by beginning with Adorno’s 
inheritance from Marx, where the concept of alienation is threefold—alienation from self, nature, 
and others. Then proceeding forward, I discuss the deviation of Adorno from the traditional 
Marxist picture in his localization of consciousness (and alienation) to the level of the individual. 
This individual consciousness can in part be seen as a return to Hegelian concepts of 
consciousness and I will argue that Adorno’s conception of consciousness has some form of 
agency. The agency, in Adorno’s consciousness, however differs greatly from the freedom of 
conscious agency discussed in Hegel, in that Adorno preserves his position of historically 
determined materialism. Although he acknowledges agency, this agency lacks any freedom 
because of the extent of its inherent alienation and the constant reification of alienation. 
I. The Problem of Alienation in Adorno 
While Adorno does have fundamental deviations from Marx, he clearly positions the 
basis of his thought within the Marxist tradition. The identification of the phenomenology of 
alienation in Adorno is, however, rather problematic. Adorno’s hatred for phenomenology leads 
him to write in a fashion, such that he does not engage in explicit identification of phenomena. 
For Adorno, phenomenology is a form of bourgeois thought that attempts to reconcile the subject 
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/ object relation in a dissatisfying fashion. His only phenomenology, is therefore a critique of this 
subject / object relation—a critique that does not build a positive identification of phenomena. 
He thus utilizes a form in his writing that avoids the identification of the underlying phenomenon 
by relying upon the level of abstract, negative-dialectical thought. In the attempt to identify the 
phenomena of alienation within Adorno’s thought, his position in the Marxist tradition becomes 
incredibly important. Adorno inherits the concept of alienation through the Marxist tradition. 
Marx’s empirical analyses of the phenomena of alienation are not discussed by Adorno, as they 
have already (in the Marxist paradigm) been empirically established. Thus, in the discussion of 
the threefold nature of alienation—alienation from self, nature, and others—is redundant to 
Adorno’s project, but is important to the holistic identification of Adorno’s conception of 
alienation. The clear Marxist nature of Adorno’s project, therefore, provides a heuristic argument 
for such a form of alienation, without the redundancy of further reiterating Marx’s empirical 
analysis. It is thus necessary, in order to explicate the fundamental phenomena of alienation in 
Adorno, to turn to Marx’s empirical analysis of alienation. 
Marx’s analysis concludes that the three-fold nature of alienation is derived from the 
ever-pervasive form of empirical alienation found in capitalistic society—alienated labour. 
Under capitalism, the distinction between the “property-owners and the propertyless workers,”1 
is established and the worker is coerced to work for the capitalist, such that he is separated from 
his product. The product of his labour becomes the property of the capitalist and thus the worker 
is alienated from his work. The lack of participation of the worker in the profits derived from his 
work is a primary issue that Marx identifies with regard to alienation. The worker is separated 
                                                 
1 Marx, Karl. “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.” The Marx-Engels Reader. Ed. Robert C. Tucker. 
2nd ed. New York: Norton, 1978. Print. 70. 
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from his work and he is disenfranchised through the process of production. The consequence is 
that his labour becomes an external object, commodified, and exists as something alien to him. It 
possesses a hostile power over him and undermines his autonomy. Alienated labour is 
responsible for the three other forms of alienation identified by Marx as “production itself must 
be active alienation.”2 Alienated labour thus produces a threefold alienated phenomenon.  
Because of the split in self, caused by the alienation of one’s labour, which separates man 
as subject from his identity as worker, man’s self becomes alienated from itself. Within the 
Marxist paradigm, activity precedes consciousness. Life activity is thus the positing of self. As 
man’s life-activity (work) becomes alienated through the processes of capitalism, it produces 
“the estrangement of man from man.”3 The production of worker as commodity, inherent in the 
wage system of capitalism, denies the worker his identity as subject. He becomes objectified and 
is thus separated from his nature as subject. He is a worker first, and only secondarily does he 
exist as a subject. Work becomes necessary for him to experience himself as subject and yet 
within the processes of work, this is exactly what he is denied; “the extremity of this bondage is 
that it is only as worker that he continues to maintain himself as a physical subject, and that it is 
only as a physical subject that he is a worker.”4 His life becomes only a means to life and thus he 
suffers. This alienation of each man from himself leads to the alienation of man from others. 
Within a system of alienated labour, man views others from the position of a worker. 
Thus, the relationship of man to others becomes infected with the alienation that man 
experiences within himself as a result of his labour, “estranged labour estranges the species from 
man.”5 If man’s life-activity belongs to a being alien to himself, then his relationship to this 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 74. 
3 Ibid. 77. 
4 Ibid. 73. 
5 Ibid. 75 
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being—the other—becomes inherently alienated. Man’s consciousness of himself exists on the 
level of the collective in Marx.6 Thus if man is alienated from self, he is by necessity alienated 
from the other. This alienation occurs through a practical medium,  
Thus through estranged labour man not only engenders his relationship to the 
object and to the act of production as to powers that are alien and hostile to him; 
he also engenders the relationship in which other men stand to his production and 
to his product, and to the relationship in which he stands to these other men.7 
 
As this alienation informs his self, so it also infects his relationships. Man becomes alienated 
from society because his own life-activity—his labour—is alienated. The processes of 
production condition the relation of man to man, thereby transferring alienation from one sphere 
to another. These two effects of alienated labour, alienation from self and from others, interact 
with each other and further alienate man from nature.  
Nature is the means for man’s sustenance; however, under the conditions of capitalism 
and as a result of alienated labour, man becomes alienated from nature. Man relies upon nature to 
provide the necessities of life; however, “the more the worker by his labour appropriates the 
external world, sensuous nature, the more he deprives himself of a means of life.” 8 In order to 
live, man must work within the conditions provided to him by society; however, these conditions 
deprive him of the means for life through forcing him to appropriate the external world—
nature—and thus to alienate himself from it. Man, who once lived in accordance with nature 
without needing to possess it, now divides the external world into different pieces of property. 
Thus Marx argues that domination of nature is inherent to alienation from Nature, a concept 
                                                 
6 This is a point of strong deviation of Adorno from Marx. Marx’s conception of consciousness does not deal with 
the level of the individual, but rather is identified first as the consciousness of species-being and later, as alienation 
and domination become pervasive in society, consciousness becomes divorced from species being and becomes 
more localized to class-consciousness.  
7 Ibid. 78. 
8 Ibid. 72 
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which is quite formative in the Adornian picture. The propertyless worker is thus directly 
alienated from nature in that he appropriates nature for the capitalist, using property that he 
doesn’t own to produce commodities which he is incapable of purchasing with his own wage. 
Even the mere concept of property implies alienation from nature in that it refuses man, as 
species, equal participation in nature as a means to life.   
Adorno’s inheritance of these concepts of alienation is important to establishing the 
holistic concept of alienation in his thought. The development that Adorno makes in the concepts 
of alienation cannot be understood except as implementing these phenomena. That is, without 
understanding alienated consciousness as estrangement from others and nature, in addition to the 
obvious alienation from self that is inherent in Adorno’s conception, then Adorno’s critique of 
enlightenment would be nonsensical. It is from the primal alienation of consciousness that the 
drive [Trieb] to domination procedes. This drive to domination is the basis for the equation of 
enlightenment to myth and of fascism to capitalism. The fundamental difference between 
Adorno’s understanding of alienation and the traditional Marxist’s conception lies in the 
causality of alienation. As discussed, within Marx’s paradigm, all alienation is essentially 
alienation of man from labour. Adorno, however, intensifies the problem of alienation by 
positing a different causality. In Adorno, all alienation proceeds first from alienated 
consciousness. This conception of consciousness is also a fundamental dissention with the 
Marxist tradition and will now be investigated at length.  
II. Individual Consciousness vs. Collective (class) Consciousness 
While Adorno does inherit the phenomena of alienation from Marx, his thought diverges 
from traditional Marxism as a result of the attention he gives to individual consciousness. Within 
Marx’s thought, the consciousness operates at the level of the collective. Individual 
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consciousness is of no concern for Marx because of his axiomatic standpoint that “Life is not 
determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.”9 Individual consciousness is therefore 
of no importance in his philosophy of historical materialism. The material nature of 
consciousness is such that it is derived from one’s life-activity—from work. One’s work does not 
flow from agency of the person, but is rather determined by the needs of man. The society 
produces needs and man’s life activity is determined according to the pursuit of the satisfaction 
of those needs. Man’s individual consciousness is therefore simply a product of the 
consciousness of the collective, insofar as the consciousness is consciousness of life-activity and 
life-activity is necessarily oriented toward the satisfaction of needs.  
Adorno, however is concerned with the individual consciousness. Consciousness, for 
Adorno, can only exist in reference to subjectivity. Subjectivity, likewise, can only exist in the 
distinction of itself from objectivity. That is, the subject can only be subject insofar as it takes 
something for its object. There can be no such thing as a subject without having something for 
which it takes as its object because then the subject would have no subjectivity because it would 
have no apprehension and therefore it would simply exist as object and not as subject. 
Additionally, a subject is also an object, insofar as other subjects perceive that subject as their 
object. Adorno’s account of consciousness is highly reliant upon the concept the emergence of 
the conscious in the emergence of subject / object distinctions. Adorno operates within a sort-of 
Nietzschean metaphysic—wherein the “The separation of subject and object is both real and 
semblance;”10 real because the perception of the separation cannot be divorced from one’s 
consciousness, but semblance because differentiation comes from undifferentiation. The world 
                                                 
9 Marx, Karl. “The German Ideology.” The Marx-Engels Reader. Ed. Robert C. Tucker. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 
1978. Print. 155. 
10 Adorno. Critical Models. 249. 
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which exists before the emergence of subject / object distinctions is incomprehensible and 
simply chaos. 
Adorno asserts that there is an alienation presented to man in the emergence of 
consciousness as such. He also inherits a similar primal origin to his concept of consciousness 
from Marx, who shows that primal consciousness is directly related to religious consciousness. 
He does, however, give a slightly different genesis story to the emergence of consciousness. Man 
emerges from the chaos of nature only through the false establishment of himself as separate 
from everything else.  
Before the subject constituted itself, undifferentiatedness was the terror of the 
blind nexus of nature, was myth; it was in their protest against this myth that the 
great religions had their truth content. After all, undifferentiatedness is not unity, 
for the latter requires, even according to Platonic dialectic, diverse entities of 
which it is the unity. For those who experience it, the new horror of separation 
transfigures the old horror of chaos, and both are eternal sameness.11  
The transition from undifferentiatedness to the differentiation of self from the other (subject from 
external object) comes in such a fashion that necessitates the estrangement of the self from that 
which is other. Self-consciousness, which is the basis of subjectivity, finds its basis in a 
distinction that is historically ungrounded, and in the foundation of a form of reason which 
necessitates the alienation of the self from its own self. The subject, in order to perceive anything 
must perceive that which is to be perceived as an object—for were a subject to perceive that 
which is to be perceived as subject, this would violate the pricipum individualis, upon which its 
very consciousness is based upon, which is differentiatedness.  
                                                 
11 Adorno, Theodor W. Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. New York: Columbia UP, 1998. Print. 246 
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This emergence of consciousness becomes the moment in man, which determines its 
history. Consciousness, which gives man the illusion of freedom, denies man this freedom 
precisely in the differentiation of self from other. In this lie, which the self tells itself in order to 
be constituted as a self, the self-determines itself to be subject to the world—for it must define 
itself as the negation of that which is external to it. Man thus becomes opposed to nature, while 
simultaneously subjected to it. This is what inspires man’s first impulse toward domination. The 
desire to escape the subjection to nature is determined by the principum individualis, which is the 
first cause of the origin of consciousness and is first expressed in myth. In primal man:  
the good and evil powers, the holy and the unholy, were not unambiguously 
distinguished. They were bound together like genesis and decline, life and death, 
summer and winter. The murky, undivided entity worshiped as the principle of 
mana at the earliest known stages of humanity lived on in the bright world of the 
Greek religion. Primal and undifferentiated, it is everything unknown and alien; it 
is that which transcends the bounds of experience, the part of things which is 
more than their immediately perceived existence12 
Myth becomes on one hand an escape from the rigid distinctions between self and other, as the 
god is both other and an extension of self, while simultaneously being man’s expression of 
domination—placing himself as superior to nature through the knowledge of nature that he 
derives from the myth. Man’s first encounter with nature is as ‘other’, which designates the 
estrangement of man from nature. In realizing the ‘otherness’ of nature, man cries out in terror of 
the unknown, but “the cry of terror called forth by the unfamiliar becomes its name.”13 This is 
the origin of myth—or religious consciousness—which serves to reify (falsify) the already 
alienated consciousness of man. Myth “fixes the transcendence of the unknown in relation to the 
                                                 
12 Adorno, Theodor W and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002. Print. 11 
13 Ibid.  
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known, permanently linking horror to holiness.”14 Myth gives man power over nature, while 
becoming the echo of what was before the emergence of subjectivity.  
That which is in nature becomes, for the conscious, both what it is and a symbol for 
something else—mana—the manifestation of the divine within the world. Adorno writes that, 
“This does not mean that the soul is transposed into nature, as psychologism would have us 
believe; mana, the moving spirit, is not a projection,”15 but is rather the expression of the very 
weakness of the ego of primitive man in its reflection of the undifferentiatedness from which 
consciousness emerges. The mythic reflection upon the world has its genesis in the failure of 
man’s ego to fully impose itself upon the world as differentiated. As within Marx, the 
consciousness of man becomes conscious of itself as opposed to “the immediate sensuous 
environment … a completely alien, all-powerful and unassailable force.”16 Adorno builds off of 
this moment in Marx, emphasizing this historical moment as the foundation of consciousness and 
arguing that the alienation in this moment has never seen emancipation—at least as a historical 
moment. Marx emphasizes this moment as a proto-communism, a moment when man 
understands his species-being and works together for survival. There is no property or class 
distinctions. Adorno, rather, emphasizes this moment as the origination of alienation. The 
alienation present in the original consciousness of man enacts domination within the primal 
society. So, for Adorno, alienation is as present in proto-communism as it is within the mythic 
epoch and every subsequent system. Material forms of alienation, as exposed in Marx, are for 
Adorno the material manifestations of alienation as already present in the consciousness of 
individuals. For Marx, “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life,”17 
                                                 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Marx. “German Ideology.” 158.  
17 Ibid. 155. 
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and Adorno builds from this premise. Life first determines consciousness, in so far as 
subjectivity must reference the object as external in order to establish itself as subject. Then, 
reflexively, Adorno states that “Everything comes from consciousness.”18 A certain amount of 
agency is acknowledged in the subject by Adorno, while maintaining a position of historical 
materialism. The capacity of this agency to become free is, however, a very different question 
and will be discussed at length with Adorno’s relation to Hegelian thought.  
III. Hegel, Agency, and Self-Alienation 
While Adorno’s position on consciousness and history is clearly within the line of the 
Marxist tradition, he also draws significantly back to the Hegelian tradition in his dialectical 
method. Engels stated that Marx took the Hegelian dialectic and “turned [it] off its head, on 
which it was standing, and placed [it] upon its feet.”19 It could be said that Adorno takes Marx 
and turns him from his feet back onto his head in his return to a more Hegelian line of thought. 
Adorno is very cautious of this move, as he considers Hegel to be much too utopian of a thinker 
to be accepted whole-heartedly, “In Hegel history is regarded immediately as progress in the 
consciousness of freedom, such that consciousness for Hegel amounts to a realized freedom. 
This doctrine is extremely precarious.”20 While Adorno does acknowledge a certain amount of 
agency within individual consciousness, he rejects wholeheartedly that this consciousness exists 
in freedom. In a dialectical turn, however, Adorno also denies that freedom can exist without 
consciousness, “Where a subjective interest, a consciousness, is absent, there can be no freedom. 
Where objective conditions cease to favour a person or a category, or even obstruct and 
                                                 
18 Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. 98.  
19 Engels. “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy.” 
20 Adorno, Theodor W. History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Rodney Livingstone. 
Cambridge: Polity, 2006. Print. 3. 
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undermine them, there will be a corresponding loss of interest in them, and hence of the strength 
and ability required to help them to prosper.”21 Freedom, then can only exist with consciousness; 
however no consciousness experiences freedom as a result of its own self oppression. Adorno 
problematizes Hegel’s master-slave dialectic and turns it back upon the free-consciousness that 
Hegel seems to proclaim. 
For Hegel, consciousness is the knowing of an object. The process of this knowing is 
rather complex and is quite-frankly inapplicable to the concept of consciousness given by 
Adorno. What is important in Hegel; however, is the understanding of consciousness as freedom. 
Consciousness must exist in Freedom in the Hegelian paradigm because, as the self sets itself as 
an objective entity in the world, it determines itself. This positing of self as objective contains the 
objectification of the self—the creation of Ego. Hegel gives meaning to the tautology “Ich bin 
ich,”22 by positing the subject (Ich) as different from the object (ich): I [self] am [my] Ego. The 
synthesis of the self and the ego becomes the self, who is conscious of itself, or self-
consciousness as such. This self-determination is the origin of the freedom of agency within 
consciousness. This freedom is limited by desire, which in its movement outside the self towards 
some other object, which thereby undermines the self’s ability to establish itself as self because 
in its self-determining, it then moves away from itself. There remains freedom, however, in so 
long as the self maintains itself as self. The dialectical image that Hegel gives of self-
consciousness—the master / slave dialectic—paints this picture of simultaneous freedom, 
although existing in different forms. The master is freedom to control the self (agency) and the 
slave is the ability to freely fulfill the needs of the master. Self-consciousness is the dialectical 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 6.  
22 Hegel, G.W.F. "Die Wahrheit Der Gewißheit Seiner Selbst." Phänomenologie Des Geistes. Marxists.org. 1807. 
Web. 11 Feb. 2016. 
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synthesis of the master and the slave—the self is both master and slave simultaneously and 
therefore there exists always freedom in self-consciousness.  
For Adorno, individual consciousness exists in the relation between the object of self—
the ego—projected by the subject as self-understanding and differentiatedness and subjectivity 
itself.  The weakness of the ego, however, disturbs the master-slave relation as outlined by 
Hegel. Adorno writes, “It is the servant which the master cannot control at will.” 23 In the 
inability of the ego to establish itself as objective, the self does not have control over itself. This 
is the phenomenon identified by Adorno as ‘ego-weakness’.  It is because of the “ego [that the 
self] does not reach the point of a dialectic between his internal and external powers.”24 Thus the 
insufficiency of the self to remain as self requires its subsequent subjugation to something other 
than itself. This is satisfied to man’s subjection to nature, as seen already in Marx; however it is 
re-capitulated on the individual level, as opposed to the level of class-consciousness and species 
being that Marx operates on. Adorno repositions the subjection to nature to the individual, “In 
the mastery of nature, without which mind does not exist, enslavement to nature persists.”25 
Adorno returns to a Hegelian position in order to insert Marx’s concept of historical materialism 
into the level of the individual. By doing so, Adorno acknowledges agency to consciousness, but 
denies that freedom necessarily accompanies agency.  
The possibility of freedom within the agency of consciousness, then becomes the critical 
moment, which should be the focus of the enlightenment. Instead, Adorno criticizes the 
Enlightenment for being “totalitarian.”26 While the aims of enlightenment are noble, the effect 
                                                 
23 Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. 29 
24 Adorno. History and Freedom. 6. 
25 Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. 31 
26 Ibid. 4. 
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that it has had has been the further systemization of and differentiation from nature; which has 
had the effect of systematized domination. (Because the goals of enlightenment are fixed and 
clearly defined, they become totalizing and therefore totalitarian.) This further detachment of 
reason from nature reifies the consciousness of human beings and they begin to lose 
consciousness of themselves as nature. At this moment,  
all the purposes for which they keep themselves alive—social progress, the 
heightening of material and intellectual forces, indeed consciousness itself—
become void, and the enthronement of the means as the end, which in late 
capitalism is taking on the character of overt madness, is already detectable in the 
earliest history of subjectivity.27  
The very emergence of subjectivity requires its differentiation from the object. This 
individuation reflects the later movement of enlightenment to completely detach the individual 
from nature, but by doing so, undermines the very goal of the enlightenment—greater freedom—
and replaces it with reification. 
The problems of individual agency in Adorno are furthered by more traditional Marxist 
claims, where he discusses class-consciousness. Since the individual’s consciousness is reified 
through enlightenment and capitalism, the individual’s consciousness becomes determined 
through the primacy of the object. The agency, lacking freedom, remains latent; however the 
discussions of class-consciousness, or the discussion of man as species-being become useful in 
explicating the phenomena of alienation. Adorno writes, “The principle of individuality was 
contradictory from the outset. First, no individuation was ever really achieved. The class-
determined form of self-preservation maintained everyone at the level of mere species being.”28 
So, while the consciousness of persons has the potential of agency, any freedom in this agency 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 43.   
28 Ibid. 125. 
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has been lost through the reification caused by the problem of individuation. This problem arises 
from the problem of subject / object distinctions as previously discussed. The mastery of self, as 
the object of self-consciousness, nearly always necessitates the destruction of genuine 
subjectivity, which is a necessary component of actual self-mastery. Preservation of self, then 
has historically lead to the destruction of the very thing which is to be preserved. The 
individual’s agency, then has not reached the “stage at which self-awareness might lead this 
rationality to bring about change.”29 Enlightenment has promised this stage and simultaneously 
denied it from becoming realized through technical, systematized domination of nature and 
persons. Adorno’s rejection of Utopian thought is not strictly speaking pessimism, but rather is 
the identification of the underlying problems brought about by alienation. True enlightenment 
remains a possibility; however the present “enlightenment… becomes mass deception and is 
turned into a means for fettering consciousness. It impedes the development of autonomous, 
independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves.” 30 There is, then, the 
possibility in Adorno for persons to have full, autonomous agency—to judge and decide 
consciously—however the reification, which is always present prevents this agency from ever 
reaching autonomy. 
IV. Reification, Agency without Freedom 
The concept of reification, in Adorno, is important for the phenomenon of alienated 
consciousness because it prevents the potential for autonomous (free) agency from ever 
becoming expressed. This reification can be understood as a deepening of the estrangement of 
consciousness from that which it takes to be its object. This concept of reification is, similarly to 
                                                 
29 Adorno. History and Freedom. 13. 
30 Adorno, Theodor W. The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture. Trans. J. M. Bernstein. London: 
Routledge, 2001. Print. 106 
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Adorno’s conception of alienation, a deepening of the traditional concept through a localization 
to the consciousness of the individual. A rather influential figure in Adorno’s conception of 
reification is Georg Lukács, who published Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, 
which is critical of the Marxist Revolution. Lukács’ concept of reification operates at the level of 
class-consciousness. With the advent of modern capitalism, the social structure becomes 
arranged entirely around the commodity and the exchange-value of the commodity far outweighs 
its use-value and as the society becomes structured around the expression of alienated labour, the 
commodity grows in power over the consciousness of the proletariat, such that they are unable to 
realize their own alienation. In orienting the social structure toward the product of alienation, the 
consciousness, which is already alienated by estranged life activity becomes reified—or the 
alienation is further falsified. Reification is the process of estranging the already alienated. In 
other words, reification is the re-orienting the alienated consciousness back towards that which 
alienated it in the first place. What is important in the reification of Lukács is the social structure 
as it affects the class consciousness, especially of the proletariat. Adorno’s movement toward the 
consciousness of the individual then takes the concept of reification as given by Lukács and 
applies it to the individual’s alienation. 
Reification is the further estrangement of a person’s consciousness from self, nature, or 
others. This deepening of alienation—falsification—occurs through a reflective relationship of 
consciousness to the world. Because the self must assert itself over nature in order to persist as 
self, domination is a fundamental anthropomorphic drive in man. As man begins to dominate 
nature (and others with it), he creates systems and laws which reflect that domination. Adorno 
writes, “domination, in becoming reified as law and organization, first when humans formed 
settlements and later in the commodity economy, has to limit itself. The instrument is becoming 
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autonomous: independently of the will of the rulers, the mediating agency of mind moderates the 
immediacy of economic justice”31 The agency that consciousness has imposes itself on the world 
through domination; however this imposition has a negative, reflexive relationship that through 
the creation of social-structures and systems, the consciousness becomes subjected to these 
systems. Every decision of the self in Adorno becomes determined by commodities. The social 
structure, thus being oriented toward the proliferation of the commodity’s power in pursuit of 
profit gains autonomy. This autonomy of the social-structure—or instrument—is taken from its 
subjects through reification. This phenomenon, for Adorno, is not entirely constricted to modern 
capitalism, as it was for Lukács. Reification is the product of an alienated consciousness 
confronting and confronted by something other than itself. Subject / object confrontation is, for 
Adorno “already a piece of reification. Once this is seen through, then a consciousness 
objectified to itself, and precisely as such directed outward, virtually striking outward, could no 
longer be dragged along without self-reflection.”32The opposition between subject and object 
exists within the consciousness itself in the objectification of the self by the self—the ego. The 
self-reflexivity becomes the first manner in which human consciousness experiences reification 
and explains the deep-seediness of the problems of human alienation. Escaping a self-reified 
alienated consciousness necessitates more than the change in social-structures or classes. It 
requires more than the destruction of private property and non-estranged labour.  
The problem of potentiality of the emancipation of the individual is qualitatively different 
for Adorno than Marx and Lukács. Because consciousness has agency and is capable of 
imposing itself on the world, the first step of emancipation must begin with the emancipation of 
                                                 
31 Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. 29. 
32 Adorno. Critical Models. 249. 
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consciousness from the primacy of the other. The reification of consciousness, however, in its 
present state acts against the good of the conscious. Adorno writes, “Any need which might 
escape the central control is repressed by that of individual consciousness.”33 While 
consciousness in Adorno’s paradigm possesses agency, within the society of mass culture—or 
the culture industry—the individual lacks freedom in their agency as their consciousness has 
been reified by such a social structure. The implementation of agency at the level of individual 
consciousness is an important deviation of Adorno from Marx, however he maintains a position 
of historical materialism through this concept of reification. That is, while there is potential for 
agency at the level of the individual, “the primacy of the object proves itself in that it 
qualitatively alters the opinions of reified consciousness.”34 Adorno simultaneously denies and 
affirms Marx’s axiomatic claim, that life informs consciousness, not consciousness life; 
affirming that life informs consciousness (in the primacy of the object) and denying that 
consciousness cannot inform life (by admitting agency). 
Adorno’s conception of alienation is thus a movement to localization of alienation. He 
inherits Marx’s identification of the phenomena of alienation as existing in a three-fold form—
alienation from self, nature, and others. This movement towards localization of alienation while 
simultaneously retaining the phenomena identified by Marx allows Adorno to empirically 
establish the drive towards domination within the consciousness of mankind. Consciousness, 
insofar as it is alienated, is agent of all domination. Furthermore, Adorno re-appropriates Lukács’ 
concept of reification to become applicable to the level of the individual subject, giving him a 
more robust claim to the denial of freedom of individuals, especially within modern capitalism. 
                                                 
33 Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. 95. 
34 Adorno. Critical Models. 251. 
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This divergences from traditional Marxism also opens up Adorno to the dialogue with the 
Christian Tradition, which is the subject of this paper. In giving the individual agency, Adorno 
resembles a Christian anthropology more closely than other Marxists, who operate in a 
completely deterministic paradigm.  
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Augustine’s Fallen Self 
 Augustine presents a phenomenology of human fallenness that is quite similar to the 
conception of alienated consciousness in Adorno. This identification of the phenomena of the 
effects of original sin does, admittedly have an entirely different narrative of origin, and 
therefore a different metaphysic underlying it. The purpose of this paper, however is to identify 
and critically discuss the parallel in thought between Adorno and Augustine. Similarly to 
Adorno, it is not Augustine’s specific concern to illuminate the phenomenological elements of 
the effects of original sin. Augustine’s project was mostly concerned with refuting of the 
Pelagians35 and attempting to solve the problem of evil. His discussion of the effects of original 
sin come from a combination of texts, ranging from his personal Confessions, to lofty theological 
explorations such as On the Trinity, to texts in specific engagement with the Pelagians such as 
On Grace and Freedom, and also including dogmatic texts such as Augustine’s famous City of 
God.  
 According to Augustine, St. Paul begins the discussion of the effects of original sin in his 
Letter to the Romans and his First Letter to the Corinthians, by claiming that the effect of 
original sin was death.36 This death becomes understood by Augustine as twofold—death of the 
soul, and the final death, which is death of body and soul. The death “of the soul takes place 
when God forsakes it, as the death of the body when the soul forsakes it.”37 The final death is the 
solidification of the second death—that is the eternal existence in total forsakenness in adding 
the death of the body to the death of the soul. The first death is the death of specific importance 
                                                 
35 Pelagius was a bishop at the time of Augustine who held that original sin did not affect the will and therefore that 
it was possible to achieve salvation as an act of the will—without the help of God or His grace.  
36 Rom 5:12 & 1 Cor 15:21 
37 Augustine. The City of God. Trans. Marcus Dods. New York: Modern Library, 1993. Print. XIII, 2, 412.  
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for the purposes of this paper, because we are not discussing soteriological phenomenon, but 
rather phenomena that are a part of every-day human life.  
 The forsaking of the soul by God has serious consequences for human life in the 
Augustinian paradigm. It occurs when the first soul, in the beginning of times, decided to 
disobey the commandment of God (which was given to him out of love and allowed him to be 
able to love).38 This action against God and his love is done with the full consent of Adam’s will 
and is not a result of him being deceived, for were he to have been deceived, it would not have 
truly been sin, “So we cannot believe that Adam was deceived, and supposed the devil’s word to 
be truth, and therefore transgressed God’s law, but that he by the drawings of kindred yielded to 
the woman”39 Adam asserts a life with the woman to be a higher good than a life with God, 
denying the natural order, “the man could not bear to be severed from his only companion, even 
though this involved a partnership with sin.”40 Thus the soul’s revolt against God is justly 
punished and “the soul is deserted by God.”41 This desertion has consequences beyond the 
obvious soteriological and eschatological consequences and results in an estrangement of the self 
from itself.  
 The soul derives support from God in order to exist as master over its body. As the soul 
rejects the authority of God, so too does the body reject the authority of the soul. This is a result 
of the loss of authority in the rejection of authority by the soul. In other words, “The soul, 
                                                 
38 Were Adam to have had no commandment from God, having no specific revelation from God, he would not be 
free to love God because having no knowledge of God he would be unable to love him to move towards God. Man 
cannot love what he does not know and therefore the commandment was required in order for God to give Adam 1) 
knowledge of him and his will and 2) an opportunity also to disobey and turn away from love. For love without the 
option to not love is not truly love, but rather simply compulsion. The original commandments were therefore 
lovingly sent from God in order to give Adam the opportunity to love God, truly and freely.  
39 Ibid. XIV, 11, 459 (Quoted in Marion’s  
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. XIII, 14, 423 
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reveling in its own liberty, and scorning to serve God, was itself deprived of the command it had 
formerly maintained over the body.”42 There enters into the human a split—basically 
investigated—the members of the body no longer always obey the soul, as they would have 
before man fell. In his disobedience to himself, man experiences misery, “For what else is man’s 
misery but his own disobedience to himself, so that in consequence of his not being willing to do 
what he could do, he now wills to do what he cannot?”43  Shame covers the movements of the 
body, which are no longer under the control of the soul. Man becomes alienated from himself, 
not being able to even be in full control of his body. This shame, however produces yet another 
conflict between human beings.  
The woman becomes the object of Adam’s desire, and rather than acknowledging her in 
the love of God, he encounters her simply as object of his desire. In dis-acknowledging her as 
subject, this sin has communal effects, and she reacts to this objectification of herself in like 
manner. They thus can no longer stand before one and other as subjects, without shame in their 
nakedness, but rather feeling the alienation from the other, they are shamed and hide themselves. 
This opening of the eyes is the emergence of their objectification of the other and becomes lust, 
as well as the realization that they have been objectified. “[Lust] moves the whole man with a 
passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that the pleasure which 
results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures.”44 This is a direct result of the alienation of their 
soul from God. Through the proclamation of self-will over love, man chooses freely to deny 
God’s love and to remove his will from its proper place, in its subjection to God. Thus he 
willingly chooses to sever himself from original justice and to exist in fallenness.  
                                                 
42 Ibid. XIII, 13, 422 
43 Ibid. XIV, 15, 463 
44 Ibid. XIV, 16, 464 
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Lust, as a secondary movement of the consequences of original sin, becomes alienation 
from others. Lust is not only to be understood in Augustine as sexual lust, for it is also 
multifaceted, “There is, therefore a lust for revenge, which is called anger; there is a lust of 
money, which goes by the name of avarice; there is a lust of conquering, no matter by what 
means, which is called opinionativeness; there is a lust of applause, which is named boasting. 
There are various lusts, of which some have names of their own, while others have not.”45 Lust 
becomes an inordinate movement of the lower passions toward an object. Thus, the power of lust 
places such an object in a position of primacy. Lust of money, for example, places money above 
all else, and persons who succumb to such lust place money above the proper order of their life, 
denying their proper identity and assuming an identity defined by money. Likewise this takes 
place with every type of lust which becomes dominant in a person’s life. This lust leads persons 
to alienate them from each other, in placing objects external to the identity of persons above the 
persons themselves.  
In the case of sexual lust, a person becomes the object of the lustful desire. In this 
process, the whole person is not taken as the object of desire, but rather, the elements of the other 
which produce pleasure. This objectification of the person thus takes place in the fallen 
reproductive act, wherein the complementary parts of the man and the woman are required. 
Human’s need to reproduce (that the human race will not become extinct) necessitates this 
relation to the other; however this relation cannot happen in the way in which it was previously 
intended. Sexual relations become the first of the fallen relations, the first division of labour. The 
man and his wife are alienated from each other through lust, that is, the objectification of the 
sexual act that occurs in the fallen consciousness of mankind. The simultaneous objectification 
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of the other and subjective desire for the obtainment of the object result in the rejection of unity 
that was once inherent in the act. Thus Augustine claims that shame is always present in the 
sexual act. This shame is not necessarily the same as would be colloquially understood today, but 
rather pertains to the private nature of the sexual act. Sex is something that only occurs in private 
and discreet places and Augustine believes this to be the indicator of shame. “Lust requires for 
its consummation darkness and secrecy… all right actions wish to be set in the light i.e. desire to 
be known. This right action, however, has such a desire to be known, that yet it blushes to be 
seen.”46 This shame elucidates the alienation from other present in the sexual act. The lover 
objectifies the beloved such that they cease to be the beloved, insofar as the beloved becomes to 
the lover an object of pleasure. Thereby the act which was once meant as expression of union 
and life-giving love has become a manifestation of alienation.  
Man also becomes alienated from nature. Whereas once he existed in perfect harmony 
and receptivity of nature, his relation to nature is now cursed, “Because you listened to your wife 
and ate from the tree about which I commanded you, you shall not eat from it, cursed is the 
ground because of you! In toil you shall eat its yield all the days of your life.”47  Before his 
willing severance from God, he was able through this relation to receive nature and his response 
was proper to his position in nature; however as a result of his fall, his position in nature has 
been violated and he must now labour by the sweat of his brow to produce for himself. The 
ground must be tilled and he must ‘toil’ in order to survive. Nature, as man’s sustenance no 
longer yields according to man’s needs, but instead becomes the object of man’s desire. In order 
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for man to survive, he must dominate nature in toil. The exertion of his will over everything 
becomes necessary to his survival. 
The moment of original sin, the emergence of pride and self-consciousness, comes from 
Adams’ exertion of his will away from God. This severance of relation results in a revolt of the 
body against the soul and a divorce of contemplation and action, this “opposition only arose 
when, through sin, activity became a hindrance, a disturbance to contemplation.”48  This 
moment, where “I will” replaces “I love” thus relates directly to its effects. Adam’s exercise of 
his will is met by God’s response—then by your will shall you toil. The fall from perfection 
necessitates man’s fallen relation to nature. As harmony between man and nature no longer 
exists, man must now attempts to restore this lost relations through the exercise of his will. The 
disposition toward and encounter with nature, is however altered as a result of the emergence of 
subject / object relations. Man’s relation to nature no longer exists in a state of receptivity; but 
rather is altered such that man’ active role is severed from his contemplative role. He no longer 
receives the animals and calls them by name, but instead he must hunt them as prey. He no 
longer eats freely of the fruits of the trees in the garden, but rather works in toil by the sweat of 
his brow to cultivate food through plowing, sowing, and reaping. The fallen person can therefore 
be understood as alienated from God, self, and others. 
I. Augustine’s Self—self-awareness and divide in the self 
Augustine’s conception of the self after the fall exists in a fashion that is alienated from itself 
through a split in the self. As discussed this split exists between the body and the soul, but there 
is a further split, which exists at the level of self-consciousness. Augustine teaches that a person 
                                                 
48 Balthasar, Hans Urs Von. "Action and Contemplation." Explorations in Theology. Vol. 1. San Francisco: Ignatius, 
1989. Print. 232. 
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is conscious of their self in the process of thought. Beginning with the fall, and as a result of the 
forsakenness of man by God, a conception of the self by self—or ego49—emerges as the 
manifestation of pride. The self requires memory of itself in order to be conscious of itself as 
more than just a fleeting temporal existence. This memory (memoria) Augustine posits as 
extending beyond the self’s conception of self because the self remembers itself through its own 
memory.50 The self, then is finite in its conception of itself (and, indeed in its ontological 
manifestation), but it possesses a faculty of memory, which extends beyond the conception of the 
self. Jean-Luc Marion discusses this phenomenon as self-alienation  
It [memoria] teaches me that in thinking, I am put at a distance from myself and 
become other than I myself, that in thinking, I do not enter into possession of any 
myself that could exactly and truly say itself in saying I, that the more I think 
myself (and the more I am by thinking), the more unknowing I become of who I 
am and alienated from myself.51 
The self, in trying to know itself, is limited in its conception of itself, which must be more finite 
than the self itself is. The self, then limits its conception of itself by becoming hidden from itself. 
The ego, then, is limited in its manifestation as it cannot correlate fully to the actual self—that is, 
the self cannot become fully conscious of its own self. This inability of the ego to manifest itself 
as equivalent to the self poses problems for self-awareness; that is, the self of which a person is 
aware (ego) is not the self; “the supposed ego manifests itself by demonstrating the contradiction 
in it of its equality to itself. From the beginning A is not A; I am not myself.”52 Thomas Pfau 
                                                 
49The use of the term ‘ego’ is done in order to aid dialogue of Augustine’s ancient thought with Adorno’s modern 
conceptions of self and self-consciousness. In his book In the Self’s Place; The Approach of Saint Augustine, Jean-
Luc Marion uses this terminology to explain Augustine’s conception of the self in his chapter, “The Ego or the 
Gifted,” in order to explain Augustine to a modern audience. 
50 “if memoria, which contains the secret of my mind (abditum mentis), goes beyond what my cogiatatio and my 
mens comprehend, then I will have to think beyond my own thought if I ever want to think myself.” Marion, Jean-
Luc. In the Self's Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine. Trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 
2012. Print. 80 
51 Ibid.. 63. 
52 Ibid. 65. 
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claims that “The self [is] constitutively divided rather than subject to occasional ‘conflicted’ 
feelings.”53 The ego possesses a weakness of manifesting itself as a self and is therefore the 
cause of the alienation of self-consciousness.  
 This inability of the self to be truly conscious of itself, combined with the simultaneous 
notion of a self, which demands that it is conscious of itself (namely the ego) leads to the split in 
self. This split is a result of a mind (mens) which is a faculty of the soul, but which 
conceptualizes itself “like a body.”54 Augustine claims that there exists a desire for happiness 
within the mind. Everyone experiences this desire—it is central to the human condition. The 
happiness, which Augustine identifies as the object of everyone’s desire is not simply the 
‘feeling’ of happiness, for he refers to this as ‘delectation’ and this feeling is fleeting, happiness 
is rather a state of being happy—a permanent resting in joy—the proper end of human life. This 
desire is known to some persons and unknown to others, but exists in all, “Even he who does not 
want to live happy wants to live happy… necessity constrains us to do so, since it is true that, on 
one hand, everybody wants to live happy and, on the other, everyone does not want to live in the 
sole way in which one can live happy.”55 That is, it is necessarily a part of human nature to 
desire happiness (as this is the proper telos to which humans are oriented), but the order of life 
necessary to move toward such an end is not desirable to the mind because the mind does not 
think of itself as spiritual, but rather as a body. In thinking itself as a body, it orients itself toward 
material goods (which are opposed to happiness in their temporal nature).  
                                                 
53 Pfau, Thomas. Minding the Modern: Human Agency, Intellectual Traditions, and Responsible Knowledge. 
University of Notre Dame, 2015. Print. 117. 
 
54 De Trinitate 10.3.8  [Quoted in Pfau’s Text.—(P)] 
55 Ibid. XIII 2, 7, 16, 284 [Quoted in Marion’s Text—(M)] 
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 This orientation outward, toward material objects relocates the intrinsic desire (that which 
is oriented toward spiritual happiness) into the material world. Objects are apprehended by the 
person as the means of happiness and desire moves the person toward the object of its desire. 
The objects thus gain a certain primacy over the self—leading the self outside of the self through 
their eliciting desire. Marion reflects upon Augustine’s concept of desire claiming that, “desire 
comes to me as from elsewhere, therefore from beyond myself,”56 and that my desire “does not 
come from me but imposes itself on me.”57 The imposition of desire on the self from the world is 
a result of the mind’s denial of itself and therefore its true desires. As worldly desires impose 
themselves upon the self, life becomes in its entirety temptation. Everything to which the self 
finds itself moving is a temptation, which alienates man from happiness, “thus, as if crushed 
beneath its own weight, the mind finds itself cast out of happiness.”58 As this process continues, 
the mind, being cast out of happiness only seeks it all the more, however the imposition of the 
world on the consciousness of man only relocates that desire for happiness back into the world 
and thereby further denies man the happiness he seeks. Life then, becomes a cyclical movement 
toward happiness, which is denied to the self as a movement of present desire because of the split 
in self.  
II. Augustine’s Divided Will—Role of Desire and Love 
Augustine conceptualizes the will as the agent of choice which is unfree yet responsible, 
divided yet unifiable, synonymous with the self yet divorced from the true will of the self—in 
other words, the will is the most conflicted part of human nature. As has already begun to be 
discussed, desire plays a role in the alienation of the will from the self—in taking away freedom 
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from the will. The place where this is most clearly seen in Augustine is in the movements of the 
sexual appetite. Thomas Pfau reflects on this phenomenon, “Augustine’s emergent sexuality 
correlates the will with the ‘restlessness of youth’ and a consequent fascination with the created 
body at the expense of the creator. He characterizes this state as being ‘drunk on the invisible 
wine of its own will, perverse as it is and bent on lower things’ (Confessions 2.3.6)”59 The will, 
which if it were not fallen, would follow the mind in reason, instead becomes ‘drunk on itself’ as 
it allows desire to take a primary role. The will, in having sinned, relinquished its freedom. This 
lack of freedom then afterward gives way to the primacy of desire,  “A perverted will precedes 
the drama of contingent desires and temptations rather than being caused by them… the disorder 
and division of the will must not be misconstrued as something externally obtruded but, rather, 
as the inescapable manifestation of inherited sin.”60 The fallen will thus, in its own weakness, 
allows itself to be a slave to desire,61 moving only towards what is immediately desirable and not 
towards rational ends. But, man deceives himself into believing what he desires is, in fact, the 
truth.  
For humans as rational beings desire to find truth, as they desire happiness. But, in desiring 
something that is contrary to the truth and by willing such a desire, they also will that what they 
will may be true, “And thus they hate the truth on account of the thing that they love in place of 
the truth.”62 The mind thus becomes subjected to a will that is not rational. In willing that 
something become truth, the mind allows the will to have primacy over it—whereas in a properly 
ordered person Augustine would envision the will following the mind and always acting 
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60 Ibid. 115 
61 “My will was perverted, and became a lust; I obeyed my lust as a slave, and it became a habit [consuetudo]; I 
failed to resist my habit, and it became a need.” Confessions. 8.5.10 (P) 
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according to proper reason. In the fallen-state, persons are unable to discern perfectly between 
reason and desire because the will is subjected to desire and then wills that the mind assert what 
the will wills as truth. In his confessions, Augustine writes, “The mind commands the body, 
which obeys at once; the mind commands itself, and it resists [itself].”63 The mind is not 
necessarily divided from reason and can discern (albeit imperfectly) truth. It is however one of 
the largest paradoxes in Augustine’s thought as to how the mind can assert a truth, which then 
loses the power of the will to will at all, “The mind commands that the mind will; this mind is 
not something other and yet it does not do it. Whence this paradox? And why? It commands I 
say, willingly since it would not command if it did not will, yet it does not do what it 
commands.”64 The mind commands the will to will what it cannot will when the mind 
commands the will to follow truth. Truth, in being rational and ordered away from individual 
material things, is not an immediate desire of man (especially because he wills what he desires to 
be truth, even though what he desires is individual and material). The result is, that in willing to 
will what is good and properly ordered, man is unable to will what he wills and wills precisely 
what he does not will.  
This complete lack of freedom in fallen man to do anything other than that to which is will is 
oriented by the world of desire creates a conflict within man and causes him pain and suffering. 
This is especially true if one attempts to exit this cycle of unfreedom, “My two wills, one old, the 
other new, the first carnal, the other spiritual entered into conflict with one another and in their 
discord, ravaged my soul.”65 One is unable to exit the paradox the “powerlessness to will.”66 
Because desire comes from outside, the self necessitates something external to change in order to 
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desire what it commands that it wills. When he simply attempts to will his way out of the 
situation, Augustine remarks that, “I have become to myself a land of difficulty over which I toil 
and sweat.”67 This work is however to no avail. The will cannot overcome the obstacle that it is 
to itself. The will exists in its natural state with no freedom to will what it actually wills—
destined to will only what is desired for it by the flesh.  
Now, this lack of freedom does not infer, according to Augustine, a lack of responsibility for 
one’s actions, or a lack of agency. Actions that are contrary to the good (evil) still are chosen by 
the will—even if the will had no other choice, the action was willed by the will. Therefore, there 
is no efficient cause of an evil will, “for it is not efficient, but deficient, since this will is not 
effective but defective. For defecting from what is supremely, so as to fall toward what is less, 
this to begin to take on an evil will.”68 For were the will not to have agency (that is, were the will 
not able to effect things in the world), then it would not be a will, rightly speaking. So, within the 
Augustinian paradigm, the will’s freedom is compromised by its disordered nature, but the will 
does consent to each action of the will, “Thus when I willed or did not will something, I was 
wholly certain that it was I and no one else who was willing it or not willing it; and I was now on 
the point of perceiving that therein lay the reason for my own sin.”69 While the will may not 
have freedom to will anything other than the desires of the self, the will certainly does belong to 
the self, “My will is identified with me, to the point that it would become the self itself, this same 
self which most often escapes me under other names, under other movements, under the mask of 
my desires and my temptations.”70 In other words, Augustine’s will is responsible yet divided.71 
                                                 
67 Confessions. X, 16, 25, 14, 184 (M) 
68 City of God. XII, 7, 35, 170  
69 Confessions 7.3.5 (P) 
70 Marion. In the Self’s Place. 163. 
71 Pfau. Minding the Modern. 109.  
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It lacks the freedom to will what is truly best for it and insofar as the self’s desires are imposed 
upon it from the world, the will’s decisions are likewise determined by the world through those 
desires, but it must be, for Augustine, that the will still is freely chosen by the self.  
  So, desires are imposed upon the self from outside the self (belonging to the world) as 
temptations, which are seemingly inescapable by the will. The will is determined, in its fallen 
state, to will what it desires, even if what it desires is not what the mind commands that it wills. 
Is it then possible for the will to truly ever will what is best for the will, namely for Augustine, 
the will of God? The answer is twofold—Yes and No. The stark ambiguity of whether or not one 
is able to will emancipated from the determinism of the will is a result of Augustine’s 
understanding of love and grace. Love, understood as eros, is the strongest of the desires. Love 
gives the will the power to truly will, “I can will truly, fortiter et intigre, only if I love. Love does 
not constitute one of the possible uses of the will but the sole truly efficient (not deficient) mode 
of the will. It should not be said that the will alone permits loving but that loving alone permits 
truly willing.”72 Love as a desire allows the fallen will to operate according to its original telos. 
Love is not, though, a movement of the will but rather is a desire that, when properly ordered 
comes through grace. Grace is a gift from God, which is ever available to all humans. Grace 
gives humans the ability to love what is true and therefore, “puts the soul into motion as the 
place toward which it tends. For the place of the soul is not located as if in some space, which the 
form of a body would occupy, but in delectation where it rejoices to have come by following its 
love.”73 Love, then when it exists within the proper telos, is a grace which allows man to love 
God and then to will the will of God, which is the proper end, according to Augustine, to which 
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mankind was created. Let us turn now to a discussion of the way in which grace interacts with 
the will.  
III. Short discussion of Grace and the Will 
Understanding Grace is crucial to establishing a phenomenology of Augustine’s conception 
of the self. Grace is the emancipatory potential for each person that lays hidden in the 
supernatural world as a free, unmerited gift from God. It is with grace that the will becomes truly 
free and undetermined by the external world. This grace operates within the self through love, 
transforming the fallen will from within, such that it is able to will what it knows to be best—to 
will the will of God. Augustine writes that the process of becoming transformed in Grace, 
“consisted only in not willing what I willed, but willing what you yourself willed.”74 Such it is 
when the will becomes free—it dies to itself and wills the will of another. This is not, however a 
lack of freedom, but is the result of love coming to transform the will. This paradox of self-will 
can only be understood when, “be formulated in terms of the demands of love.”75  Love, when 
accompanied by grace—that is love of the good or true—sets the soul back into its original telos, 
which is then recognized by the will as proper and according to its nature. The will then wills 
this order through assenting to the love that moves it. The will chooses this freely and can, 
therefore, reject such a transformation—but it is the freedom to choose the good which is truly 
grace, “Therefore even the victory over sin is nothing other than a gift of God, bringing into this 
combat his assistance to free choice.”76 Grace, therefore is a gift from God which brings true 
freedom to will.  
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76On grace and freedom. IV 8, 24, 110 (M) 
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 Grace is necessary for the will to be truly free, Augustine insists. Much of Augustine’s 
writing is formulated, in part, as a treatise against the Pelagians, who held that salvation could be 
achieved without grace—solely by acts of the will alone. Augustine, however insists “that the 
gap between an intentional action and its successful execution cannot be closed by human means 
alone.”77 Thus grace is required to restore freedom to the fallen will. It closes the gap between 
internal intentions and external acts of will—bringing the divided will back into a unity with 
itself.  It transforms man’s consciousness and allows him to have freedom willing what he loves. 
In Augustine, “Grace is for consciousness, an intentionality at once distant from consciousness 
and yet uniquely capable of focusing and elevating it.”78 Grace transforms consciousness, not as 
a return to a pre-fallen state, but allows even this state to become transcended and everything is 
eventually informed by love. This final stage, however, is reached by few people in this world 
and as such Augustine does not propose a utopian social structure as a possible outcome of this 
process, but rather conceptualizes utopia as something eschatological—the city of God, or the 
kingdom of heaven which exists in the midst of the city of men and won’t be made evident until 
the end of time, with the second coming of Christ.  
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Adorno and Augustine—A Critical Discussion 
 Now, we arrive at the point of the critical discussion of Adorno and Augustine, brought 
together. It is not the goal of this paper to posit a synthesis, to posit influence, or to insinuate a 
Christian undertone to Adorno. Rather, the goal is to critically approach the different paradigms, 
examining their striking similarities in the conception of the self, but also fully acknowledging 
their critical differences at the level of ontological structures and assumptions, but also even at 
the level of the phenomenon discussed. When I first set out to pursue this project, I imagined a 
perfect synthesis of these two great thinkers. On the superficial level, the similarities are salient. 
Both authors posit an understanding of alienation from nature, others, and strongly emphasize 
alienation from the self. Augustine obviously also discusses alienation from God as well; but at 
the natural level, nonetheless the synthesis seemed possible. Upon researching and beginning to 
explicate the two author’s conceptions of the phenomenon, the superficial concept of synthesis 
faded—the problematization of setting these two authors next to each other became more and 
more apparent. The differences between them seem just as large as the similarities. I do, 
however, intend in the discussion of these differences, as well as the similarities, to lay out a 
clear parallel of thought. Adorno and Augustine certainly do not exist in the same school of 
thought, but their conceptions of the self parallel each other in such a way that there is critical 
potential in attempting to bring the two together. 
I. Differences in Paradigms—Problems of Ontology and Genesis 
Adorno and Augustine come to the problems of human alienation from completely different 
angles. Adorno approaches the problem from critic of enlightenment and the culture industry and 
illuminates the problem within the light of a modern societal structure. He posits a genesis of 
Hoffman 40 
 
consciousness within primal man that has no root in the divine—operating on the level of a 
wholly material world.  Adorno, who is not a theist, critics the Catholic Church and religious 
thought in general as a alienating force in the world that suppresses persons’ freedom through the 
control of their action through morality. Theology, for Adorno is the masking of myth as 
absolute truth. Furthermore, Adorno operates out of a Nietzschean metaphysic that opposes any 
claim of an ontological order underlying the semblance of the individuation of objects. Not only 
is this his conception of the underlying chaos, but his notion is fundamental to his conception of 
self-alienation. This is all fundamentally antithetical to the suppositions of Augustine.  
 Augustine was the bishop of Hippo Regius, located in modern day Algeria, in late fourth, 
early fifth century, who came to the faith later in his life after belonging to the gnostic group the 
Manicheans and was heavily influenced by Neo-Platonism. His works are written after his 
conversion with the authority of a Bishop of the Roman Church. Augustine, therefore approaches 
issues of the human person from a fundamentally theological perspective. There is no clear 
distinction between strictly philosophical works and his theological works, as his paradigm takes 
the existence of the benevolent Christian God for granted. Augustine believes, in true platonic 
fashion, in a firmly ordered world with rigid distinctions between objects. His paradigm accepts 
the pricipum individualis for granted as a foundation of rational thought. He adheres to a 
teleology of the person, arguing that the person is created by God, and that union with God is the 
proper end of human life. In other words, at a very basic level to bring together a modern non-
theist and an ancient theist seems to be a project doomed to fail from the beginning. Adorno and 
Augustine certainly disagree at the level of their most basic outlooks on the world and this 
disagreement is one that cannot be overcome without anachronistic, unfaithful readings of the 
two thinkers. It is not, however, the nature of this project to attempt to overcome the differences 
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of Adorno and Augustine, but rather to explicate the strong similarities of their conceptions of 
the self, self-consciousness, and the role of alienation in human life.  
II. A || A; Adorno and Augustine on the Concept of Alienation and Original Sin 
As previously discussed, Adorno and Augustine’s conceptions of this phenomenon—call it 
effects of original sin or alienated consciousness—have certain esthetic similarities when 
speaking of alienation from nature, others, and self. The alienation from nature discussed by 
Adorno, manifests itself as a drive to domination. Throughout human history, whether it be the 
myth of the god of the harvest or the rationalized systemization of nature in enlightenment, 
humans create ideologies that give them an ‘edge’ over nature. Within, Augustine the alienation 
from nature is manifest in the ‘toil’ which is required of interaction with nature. In the Christian 
conception of the paradise which precedes the fall, the first persons exist in a harmony with 
nature, but as a result of their fall from grace, their work no longer exists in a receptive 
capacity—tilling and keeping—but now takes on a divorces action from contemplation that 
requires toil. Man in his toil must conquer the difficulty of nature in order to survive. This 
estrangement from nature sets humans against nature and one could historicize this opposition in 
such a fashion that it seems that man responds to this opposition to nature with a sense of 
domination. 
Central to Adorno’s project of neo-Marxist enlightenment critic is also the alienation of man 
from others through the commodification of the person. Insofar as the culture industry orients 
everything toward commodities, it also makes the person’s labour into a commodity and thereby 
alienates persons from each other. It is impossible to escape. Furthermore, the drive towards 
domination that has been intrinsic in man since the beginning is also expressed toward others—
and insofar as man attempts to dominate other men, alienation persists in the using of others as 
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means toward an end. The same goes within the Augustinian paradigm. Although the language 
differs—he refers to lust rather than domination—the underlying concept is parallel to Adorno. 
The other becomes an object (of desire) who is then used for the satisfaction of that desire (lust). 
Both authors discuss the problem innate to the human condition that persons objectify other 
persons. This creates an estrangement between people that can be referred to as alienation from 
others, which is caused by the alienation from self. 
 Within their conceptions of the self lies a central problem of ego weakness. In Adorno 
and Augustine this concept looks rather different as a result of the different explanations of the 
genesis of self-consciousness. In Adorno, the weakness of the ego is the result of a semblance of 
differentiation that has as its underlying ontological structure a fundamental undifferentiatedness. 
The ego is the claim of individuation that creates this semblance; however the ego is unable to 
fully establish itself as differentiated, causing a division in the self and takes away freedom from 
the agency of self-consciousness. This is the root cause of the primacy of the object, which has 
power over the ego insofar as the ego requires the object to remain differentiated from it. In 
Augustine, the picture is slightly different. The self is surely ontologically distinct from other 
objects and the metaphysical presupposition is that there is an underlying ontological order in the 
world. In other words, Augustine would deny an underlying undifferentiatedness. But, he posits 
a self that experiences an inability to fully establish itself. For Augustine, this is the result of the 
person’s need to rely upon God in order to exist as truly their self.  The weakness of the ego in 
Augustine is additionally the inability of the self to be fully aware of itself as a result of the 
memory extending beyond the self. The ego claims to be the self and yet does not know the self. 
Nonetheless, the similarity to be found between both versions of ego weakness is a problem of 
subjectivity to establish itself, which is connected to a problem of freedom. 
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 This problem of freedom also looks slightly different but begins to illuminate the gross 
similarities between the two conceptions of the human state. The two thinkers arrive at their 
prospective conceptions of this phenomenon in very different ways; however the parallel of their 
conclusions seems undeniable. Adorno’s movement away from the necessity of historical 
materialism—in giving agency to the self—bears with it the similarity of Augustine’s will 
divided against itself. The faculty of a ‘will’ is not explored by Adorno; however the agency of 
the individual is acknowledged. Adorno claims that the primacy of the object takes freedom 
away from the agency of consciousness. Consciousness, then, becomes determined by its 
environment. Consciousness, insofar as it becomes oriented toward the object appears to 
experience a very similar phenomenon in both Augustine and Adorno. The primacy of desire, 
which for Augustine is an experience of man that comes to him from the external world—that is, 
desire is for an object, giving a power to the external object in that it is the cause of desire. The 
object, thus in both circumstances has a primacy over the self in that person’s decisions become 
predicated by the object. Adorno’s ‘commodity-determined’ decisions can be seen as the kin of 
Augustine’s lust—the inability of the will (or agency) of the will to exist in a state of freedom 
and instead is oriented toward the material, allowing itself to become determined, despite its 
intrinsic capacity to effect the world through actions or work.   
 There thus also exists in both paradigms, a split in the self. Adorno’s conception of this 
concept is derived from Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. The self is simultaneously the master and 
the slave—but this conflict reifies the inability of the ego to establish itself as sufficient. Were 
there to exist a coherent unity within the self, then one would achieve freedom in their agency. 
The self dominates its own self and reifies its own alienation. Remedying this problem is the true 
goal of enlightenment—peace for Adorno is differentiation without domination. Similarly in 
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Augustine, the split in the self occurs on multiple levels. There exists a split between the body 
and the soul—the body revolts against the soul and the mind (mens) thus struggles to maintain 
power over the body. This is the first sign of the effects of original sin, for Augustine, and the 
remedy of this problem is the last effect of grace in transforming a person—if this problem is 
ever remedied. There exists also a division, in Augustine’s anthropology, within the will. The 
will wills what it cannot will, when it attempts to will the highest good. These splits within the 
self in Adorno and Augustine parallel each other also in their remedies, when speaking on the 
natural level. The potentiality of a permanent remedy is impossible and thus left to itself the self 
will remain split, no matter the attempt at unity.  
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Epilogue 
“The story is told of an automaton constructed in such a way that it could play a winning game of 
chess, answering each move of an opponent with a countermove. A puppet in Turkish attire and 
with a hookah in its mouth sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors 
created the illusion that this table was transparent from all sides. Actually, a little hunchback who 
was an expert chess player sat inside and guided the puppet’s hand by means of strings. One can 
imagine a philosophical counterpart to this device. The puppet called “historical materialism” is 
to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which 
today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight.” 
 ~Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” 
“To regard Christ’s knowledge as though he carried out his actions in time from some vantage-
point of eternity—rather like a chess-player of genius who quickly foresees the whole course of 
the game, and simply moves his men through a game which for him is already over—would be to 
do away entirely with his temporality and so with his obedience, his patience, the merit of his 
redemptive existence; he would no longer be the model of a Christian existence and of Christian 
faith. He would no longer be qualified to narrate the parables of expectation and waiting which 
describe the life of his followers.” 
~Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theology of History 
 
 From the outset, this project has been oriented toward accomplishing the impossible. This 
is something that was not always evident, but has manifested itself in the course of its 
completion. I set out to bring together theology and critical theory through the examinations of 
parallels in thought. It is however the nature of parallel lines that they are distinct from one 
another, always looking at the other from a distance, but never touching and certainly never 
intersecting. This conception of a theological dimension within critical theory must first 
reconcile the divide between historical materialism and the supernatural element necessitated by 
theological thought. Within historical materialism, that which effects the world must necessarily 
be material; however the theological dimension removes this necessity. This project attempted to 
circumvent this problem by arguing on the level of phenomena identified by the two schools of 
thought. This, however, proved to be a distraction from the necessity to reconcile the material to 
the supernatural; however these parallels serve as a heuristic argument for the potentiality of this 
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sphere.  The redeeming nature of this project lies in its explication of the parallels in thought 
between a father of Christian thought—Augustine—and a father of critical theory—Adorno. 
There could exist a space where critical theory enters a theological dimension. What I have 
accomplished in this project is outlining potential points of intersection, in order to justify the 
exploration of such a space. I have shown certain thoughts of Adorno to parallel the conception 
of a fourth century bishop in a way that is not exhaustive, but is certainly compelling.  
 If I were to approach this project anew, I would however certainly approach it from a 
different direction. The dialectical-structure of this text begins with Adorno as a thesis, continues 
to Augustine as an anti-thesis, and concludes in what was originally conceived as a synthesis, but 
has now become the ‘negative’ outcome of the dialectic. This structure was necessary for this 
project, but did not allow for the discovery of this space. Benjamin attempts to create such a 
space. He attempts to even reconcile theology with historical materialism; however it is this 
attempt at reconciliation that makes him antithetical to my aims. Within a Christian theological 
paradigm, there must necessarily exist non-material things, which effect the world—the trinity, 
the human soul, grace, etc. Christ is not the messianic chess-player in Benjamin’s theses. He 
does not aid determinism, but rather enables free choices that contribute to love. Historical 
materialism cannot be reconciled to Christianity, but perhaps, the future of this project exists in 
the examination of Adorno’s deviation from historical materialism and his position of 
historicized materialism. In the admission that consciousness can affect the material there exists 
a critical potential for an intersection of critical theory with theology. Perhaps, the future of this 
project necessitates the introduction of a post-Euclidean geometry—the discovery of the 
intersection of parallel lines—a space where historicized materialism secretly enlists the services 
of theology. 
